An Open Letter to Members of Parliament

AN OPEN LETTER TO MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
September 8, 2007

Dear Member of Parliament,

The Indo-U.S. bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation has raised a number of issues which are of vital importance to the nation. Through this open letter we wish to place before you the considered views of the Communist Party of India (Marxist).

Ever since the Joint Statement issued in July 2005 during the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in which the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was announced, there has been a debate in the country about the merits of such an agreement. Political parties, nuclear scientists, the media and concerned citizens have been expressing their views. Parliament has also discussed the agreement at various stages. However, the current debate is crucial as the bilateral text has been finalised and the Government is planning to take the next steps to operationalise the agreement.

It is our contention that the nuclear cooperation agreement should not be seen in isolation from the overall context of India-US strategic relations, its impact on our foreign policy and our strategic autonomy. Further, the nuclear cooperation agreement must be seen in the context of our energy security, access to technology and the development of the three stage nuclear programme.

The bilateral “123″ agreement has also to be seen also in the light of the assurances given by the Prime Minister in his statement to Parliament on 17 August 2007.

The Left parties have asked the Government not to proceed with the next steps to be taken to operationalise the agreement.

Implications of the Hyde Act

Members of Parliament will recall that in August 2006, there was a debate on the draft law being discussed by the US Senate and the House of Representatives to amend the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to give exemption for the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with India. The two draft legislations before the House of Representatives and the Senate contain many provisions which were detrimental to India’s interests.

The Prime Minister had given certain categorical assurances on the points raised regarding this draft legislation. The nine points which the Left parties had raised were covered by the Prime Minister’s statement. However, subsequent to that, the Hyde Act (Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act” was adopted by the US Congress in December 2006.

Many of the provisions of the Hyde Act go contrary to the assurances given by the Prime Minister in August 2006. What are these?

• Under the terms set out by the Hyde Act, it is clear that the Indo-US nuclear cooperation would not cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle. It denies cooperation or access in any form whatsoever to fuel enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production technologies.

• The denial extends to transfer of dual use technology and covers items which could be used in fuel enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities. Thus, dual use restrictions remain on technology transfers to India. Hyde Act section 102 (13) states, “The US should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under US law”.

• Section 103 (a)(6) of the Hyde Act says US policy shall be “Seek to prevent the transfer to a country (India, in this case) nuclear equipment, materials or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country (India, in this case) are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title (Hyde Act), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any other US law”.

The Act concerns itself with areas outside nuclear cooperation and contains objectionable clauses to get India to accept the strategic goals of the United States. These issues are:

• Annual certification and reporting to the US Congress by the President on a variety of foreign policy issues such as India’s foreign policy being “congruent to that of the United States” and specifically India joining US efforts to isolate and put sanctions against Iran [Section 104g(2) E(i)]

• Indian participation and formal declaration of support for the US’ highly controversial Proliferation Security Initiative including the illegal policy of interdiction of vessels in international waters [Section 104g(2) K]

• India conforming to various bilateral/multilateral agreements to which India is not currently a signatory such as the US’ Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group etc [Section 104c E,F,G]

It is on the basis of the Hyde Act that the United States has negotiated the bilateral “123” agreement with India. Some of the harmful provisions of the Hyde Act are reflected in the bilateral agreement.

• The bilateral agreement, while superficially using the original wording of the joint statement of 2005, “full civilian nuclear cooperation” actually denies cooperation or access in any form whatsoever to fuel enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production technologies. The statement of intent in the agreement that a suitable amendment to enable this access may be considered in the future has little or no operative value.

• Further, this denial (made explicit in Art 5.2 of the agreement) also extends to transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities, again a stipulation of the Hyde Act. Under these terms, a wide range of sanctions on a host of technologies would continue, falling well short of “full civilian nuclear co-operation”.

• It is also important to recognise that the fast breeder reactors under this agreement would be treated as a part of the fuel cycle and any technology required for this would also come under the dual use technology sanctions. This would be true even if future fast breeder reactors were put in the civilian sector and under safeguards. Thus, India’s attempt to build a three-phase, self-reliant nuclear power program powered ultimately by thorium would have to be developed under conditions of isolation and existing technology sanctions.

• Another key assurance that had been given by the Prime Minister was that India would accept safeguards in perpetuity only in exchange for the guarantee of uninterrupted fuel supply. While the acceptance on India’s part of safeguards in perpetuity has been spelt out, the linkage of such safeguards with fuel supply in perpetuity remains unclear.

The assurance that the United States would enable India to build a strategic fuel reserve to guard against disruption of supplies for a duration covering the lifetime of the nuclear reactors in operation appears to have been accepted in the agreement. However, whether the fuel supply will continue even after cessation or termination of the agreement depends solely on the US Congress. The Hyde Act explicitly states that the US will work with other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries to stop all fuel and other supplies to India if the agreement is terminated under US laws. Since this agreement explicitly incorporates domestic laws, it appears that fuel supply from the US will not only cease in case the US decides to terminate the Agreement but they are also required under the Hyde Act to work with NSG to bar all future supplies. The clause 5.6 on disruption of supplies therefore seems to be limited to “market failures” and not to cover a disruption that takes place under the clauses of the Hyde Act. In such an eventuality, the US will have to pay compensation to India but all future fuel supplies would stop. Therefore, the 123 agreement represents the acceptance of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for uncertain fuel supplies and continuing nuclear isolation with respect to a substantial amount of technological know-how.

The Hyde Act and Supremacy of National Law

The government has asserted that the Hyde Act is not binding on India. The relevant issue is that it is binding on the United States and this has been repeatedly stressed by US spokespersons.

Article 2 (1) of the 123 Agreement states, “The parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Each party shall implement this agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.

If the argument is that the reference to national laws is simply the case of binding towards the law, that will have a bearing on the conduct of different transactions under the 123 agreement, then what do we make of the reference to national laws in other places in the 123 agreement?

Thus, for instance, Article 5 (6) (a) in part states that “As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, joint statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws…to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market…..”. Article 5(6) (b) (i) states that “The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress”. These clauses show that the need for conformity with “national laws” is not superfluous. If there is no direct reference to the Hyde Act in the 123 agreement, it is simply because and this is worth reiterating that the Hyde Act is the `Act to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

Nuclear Power and Energy Security

It is said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is central to our future electricity and energy requirements. At present, nuclear power generation capacity in India stands at 4,120 MW which is a little less than 3 per cent of our installed capacity of all power plants. One reason has been the nuclear isolation imposed on us resulted in the slow development of our civilian nuclear energy programme. However our scientists overcoming many hurdles did very well in indigenising the Pressurised Water Reactors, and then developing it further to 540 MW. The next stage is the fast breeder reactors, in which the Indian scientists are leading the world. The planned three stage nuclear programme would depend largely on technologies based on fast breeder reactors, and in the future, thorium as fuel. This programme requires far less uranium and lower dependence. Instead, the imported reactor route would focus much more on Light Water Reactors, which require much more uranium and are more expensive. Thus even the technology being offered will not necessarily be the best choice for India. Significantly, the mainstay of our nuclear power program – the fast breeder reactors – will still be under technology sanctions, as they would be considered a part of the fuel cycle.

The other reason is the techno-economics of nuclear power and its relatively high cost. Nuclear power plants are about 50% per cent more expensive, even when using domestic technology and equipment. If imported reactors for nuclear power are considered, the situation becomes worse: it will cost about three times as much to set up nuclear plants with imported reactors than coal based ones. It will also cost twice as much per unit – Rs. 5.10-5.50 as against Rs. 2.50 from coal fired plants.

According to the Planning Commission’s study, the most optimistic scenario of nuclear power is 15,000 MW by 2015 and 29,000 MW by 2021. These targets includes 8,000 MW of imported reactors. Even then, nuclear energy will only add up to about 7 per cent of our total installed capacity.

Going ahead with such an ambitious power programme dependant on imports will come at a high cost and will dry up investments in other sectors. Interestingly enough, nuclear power is not the energy of choice for most advanced countries. The US itself has commissioned its last reactor in 1996! Members of Parliament may recall the fiasco of Enron and its Dabhol power plants.

Implications for Foreign Policy and Strategic Autonomy

The United States does not see the nuclear cooperation agreement as a stand-alone. It is part of American design to try in India a wide ranging strategic alliance which will adversely affect the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and our strategic autonomy. The facts speak for themselves.

• Two weeks prior to the joint statement which announced the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement, India signed a ten-year Defence Framework Agreement with the United States in June 2005. This is being cited by the Bush administration as India’s commitment to cooperate with the United States furthering its strategic interests in Asia.

• Two months after the nuclear cooperation agreement was announced in September 2005, India voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency, contrary to its stance earlier that Iran, as an NPT signatory, has every right to develop its nuclear technology for civilian purposes.

• This was followed by a second vote against Iran in February on the eve of President Bush’s visit to India.

• Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary of State, in his “On record briefing” after the finalisation of the 123 agreement said on July 27: “And I think now that we have consummated the civil nuclear trade between us, if we look down the road in the future, we’re going to see far greater defence cooperation between the United State and India: training; exercises; we hope, defence sales of American military technology to the Indian armed forces.” The United States is exercising tremendous pressure on India to buy a whole range of weaponry including the 126 fighter planes, radar, helicopters, artillery etc. worth multi-billion dollars.

Is the nuclear cooperation agreement going to bind India with the United States in a relationship which goes contrary to our cherished goals of national sovereignty and independent foreign policy and an economic development based on the priorities of our people?

The objections and the apprehensions raised by the Left parties and other parties, organisations and concerned scientists and citizens need to be examined before proceeding further. All we are asking the government to do is not to rush through with the next steps which are necessary to operationalise the deal.

We hope that you, as a Member of Parliament, which is the sovereign representative institution of the Indian people, will seriously consider these issues on this vital matter affecting our country’s future.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)

Readers’ Comments on N-Deal

Nuclear deal

The UPA government has said it will move forward with the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal only after seeking a vote of confidence in Parliament. Even if it wins, would it be proper to say the sense of the House favoured the deal? Small parties such as the TRS, the RLD and the JD(S) will play a key role in determining the outcome.

The TRS has openly said it will support the UPA only if it is given a firm assurance on a separate Telangana. The JD(S) has Karnataka politics in mind just as the Samajwadi Party is more concerned about U.P. Above all this, the Congress is bringing pressure on Mayawati through the CBI. Where is the nuclear deal in all this?

E.V. Tulasi Rao, Vijayawada

The merits and de-merits of nuclear deal aside, the UPA government’s know-all approach, in collusion with a few people in the scientific establishment, is shocking. The nuclear deal is a people’s issue, as it marks a turning point in our nuclear history. The government kept quiet all long, without forcing a public debate on it. Now it is rushing to close the deal, even while a majority has no understanding of the issue.

All talk of the Hyde Act being a domestic U.S. law is a sham. It is the enabling Act of the 123 agreement. It is a long noose woven around the 123 agreement and can be tightened at the U.S.’ will.

Balajee Rajaram, Chennai

It is painful to see that political parties, which raise a hue and cry over non-issues, are not raising their voice to save India from the catastrophic nuclear deal.

Almost all parties other than the Left are silent on the impending surrender of India’s sovereignty.

S. Radhakrishnan, Coimbatore

The Congress and its supporting parties claim that the nuclear deal is the best thing that has happened to India in a long time. On the other hand, the Left parties say it is the worst that can happen. The actual fact is somewhere in between. The people of India deserve to know the facts from a neutral and reliable body. You will do a great service by publishing the bare facts of the deal.

B.C. Bhowmick, Asansol

The UPA government’s decision to proceed with the nuclear deal is a bold step forward. When we look back at the history of development, we find that whenever our leaders have taken bold steps that contribute to the development of our country, they have been criticised.

Shibin Joseph, Kozhikode

The Parliamentary Affairs Minister has a point when he says that the draft safeguards agreement was sent to the IAEA before seeking a vote of confidence because that was the only way to make it public. The BJP’s continued reference to the Hyde Act makes little sense; such a piece of legislation could have been enacted by the U.S. even after signing the 123 agreement.

There is little India could have done about such a political manoeuvre. The best insurance against U.S. actions that can infringe upon our sovereignty lies in our strength and growing clout. The fact that the U.S. has made an exception for India, which is not a signatory to the NPT, and has declined to do so for Pakistan is proof that India’s strength is recognised.

S.K.N. Nair, Thiruvananthapuram

Americans have proved to be smarter than us as far as the 123 agreement is concerned because they discussed it threadbare, taking sufficient time. We, in India, should have also set the ball rolling on discussions to match their move. BJP leader L.K. Advani’s idea of bringing an equivalent of the Hyde Act here to insulate ourselves from its effects will not work.

The Indian equivalent can be enacted only after the deal is operationalised by the present government. The best thing to do is to put the deal in cold storage till either the Hyde Act is withdrawn or amended, or the Indian equivalent of the Hyde Act is passed by Parliament. We must do as Americans do in this case.

A. Perumal, Chennai

Many eminent scientists have pointed out that the nuclear deal is to India’s advantage because of the energy security it will provide and because nuclear energy is clean from the environmental point of view.

As for the government’s inability to contain inflation, we should understand that almost two-thirds of the world is reeling under double digit inflation and it is not of the UPA’s making.

Partha Chakravarthy, Bangalore

Hyde Act Can be Used to Terminate 123 Pact

Hyde Act provisions can be used to terminate 123 pact, says Left

Special Correspondent

 

“There are number of issues on which the pact falls short of Manmohan’s assurance in Parliament”

 

NEW DELHI: The Left parties on Tuesday reminded the Government that they had expressed serious concern about the various conditions inserted into the Henry Hyde Act passed by U.S. Congress as a number of them pertained to the strategic goals of the United States.

 

The issues identified then and recapitulated now included annual certification and reporting to U.S. Congress by the President on a variety of foreign policy issues of India being congruent to that of the U.S.; Indian participation and formal declaration of support for the U.S.’ controversial Proliferation Security Initiative; and India conforming to various bilateral/multilateral agreements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group.

 

Addressing a press conference after a Left parties’ coordination committee meeting here, CPI(M) general secretary Prakash Karat said that while all these were part of the Hyde Act, the 123 agreement referred only to the narrow question of supply of nuclear materials and cooperation on nuclear matters.

 

“Wide-ranging”

 

“The provisions of the Hyde Act are far wider than the 123 agreement and could be used to terminate the 123 agreement not only in the eventuality of a nuclear test but also for India not conforming to the U.S. foreign policy. The termination clause is wide-ranging and does not limit itself only to violation of the agreement as a basis for cessation or termination of the contract,” a joint statement by four Left leaders said.

 

They said that, therefore, the extraneous provisions of the Hyde Act could be used in the future to terminate the 123 agreement; in such an eventuality, India would be back to complete nuclear isolation, while accepting IAEA safeguards in perpetuity.

 

Sovereign right

 

The Left parties, they said, had well-known views against nuclear testing for weaponisation but that did not mean the acceptance of any U.S.-imposed curbs on India’s sovereign right to exercise that choice.

 

An important aspect of the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation was the relegation of India’s traditional commitment to universal nuclear disarmament. By getting “accommodated in a U.S.-led unequal” nuclear order, India’s leading role in advocating nuclear disarmament as a major country of the non-aligned community was being given the “go-by.”

 

They said that while the 123 agreement was being presented as a victory for India’s positions and conforming to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s assurances in Parliament, there were a number of issues on which it fell short of what Dr. Singh had assured the House.

 

“While the Indian commitments are binding and in perpetuity, some of the commitments that the U.S. has made are either ambiguous or are ones that can be terminated at a future date,” the statement said.

 

There were other aspects such as full civilian nuclear cooperation; while the 123 agreement refers to it superficially, it denies cooperation or access in any form whatsoever to fuel, enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production technologies.

 

“Commercial gains”

 

“The flawed nuclear cooperation agreement cannot be justified on the debatable basis of augmenting our energy resources or achieving energy security. The motivation for the U.S. is commercial gains which will accrue for its corporates running into billions of dollars,” they said.

 

Don’t Go Ahead with the N-Deal

Don’t go ahead with the N-deal: Top scientists

At a time when the country is divided over the Indo-US nuclear deal, three prominent nuclear scientists have urged the government not to go ahead with the controversial deal.

Former chairman of Atomic Energy Commission Dr. P K Iyengar, former chairman of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board Dr A Gopalakrishnan and former director of Bhabha Atomic Research Center Dr.A.N. Prasad say that there is a great deal of disquiet among the scientific community at large about the deal.

They also said they had met the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh earlier and discussed about the after-effects of the deal, besides writing to the MPS.

The scientists say the government should not proceed to seek IAEA board approval for the current draft safeguards agreement until its implications are debated completely by the country.

Disputing the government’s claim about the energy security aspect if the deal is signed, the scientists say it has been quantitatively shown that the additional power will come at a much higher cost per unit of electricity compared to the conventional coal or hydro power, which India can generate without any foreign imports.

In a release, the scientists argue about the repercussions of the nuclear deal.

Here are the excerpts:

“Once the deal is in place, it is also clear that India’s commercial nuclear interactions with the US as well as with any other country will be firmly controlled from Washington via the stipulations of the Hyde Act 2006 enforced through the stranglehold which the US retains on the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Any argument to the effect that the deal will be governed only by the bilateral 123 Agreement is untenable , because this Agreement in turn is anchored in US domestic laws , which include the Hyde Act . And , the Hyde Act contains several stipulations which are extraneous to the issue of bilateral nuclear co-operation , including foreign policy behaviour which India needs to adhere to if the deal is to be kept alive.

The real issue facing India , therefore , is whether or not we want this mythical extra ‘energy security ‘ through this deal , paying almost thrice the unit capital cost of conventional power plants , with the additional burden of subjugating the freedom to pursue a foreign policy and indigenous nuclear R&D programme of our own.

The nuclear deal could also have other serious repercussions, including a potential weakening of India’s nuclear deterrent and an inability to protect & promote indigenous R&D efforts in nuclear technology. A combination of the extreme secrecy with which the government has carried forward this deal , the media hype they were able to generate in its favour , the parochial interests of opportunistic individuals & organizations, and the unfortunate ignorance of the issues involved among the general public have put the country on a dangerous path, likely to lead to the detriment of the current & future generations of Indians. Today’s urgency to rush to the IAEA Board, in consonance with the American timetable , to get the safeguards agreement approved and thereafter clinch the Deal during the tenures of the current governments in India and the US must, therefore , be replaced with an openness & introspection that is vital for a serious debate which the situation demands.

The central issue about the IAEA safeguards agreement has been the doubt as to how “India-specific” these are . In particular , since it is distinctly clear from the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement that no uninterrupted fuel supplies have been guaranteed in these documents for reactors which India will place under safeguards , the government had assured that this defect will be corrected in the safeguards agreement . Since the IAEA was all along known to be no fuel-supply guarantor , there is serious doubt whether Indian negotiators obtained any assurance in this regard.

As per the 123 Agreement , the government has all along asserted that the IAEA safeguards will have “provisions for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity” . The nation would like to know clearly what these “corrective measures” will be , before plunging headlong into this deal . India being merely allowed to withdraw from safeguards the Indian-built PHWRs we may place under safeguards , and that too after stripping them of all spent & fresh fuel and components of foreign origin , is no corrective step at all because such action does not ensure uninterrupted operation of these civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Besides , this relaxation does not apply to the imported power reactors , which will use up the bulk of our investments in nuclear power ; these units will perpetually stay under safeguards , even after fuel supplies are denied .The Hyde Act prohibits the US Administration from directly or indirectly (through the IAEA or other countries) assisting India with life-time fuel supplies after suspension of the Deal . Therefore , the Government owes a clarification in this regard to the UPA-Left Committee and the public.

The 123 Agreement states that the imports under the deal “shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and an Additional Protocol, when in force”. While the actual draft of the Additional Protocol (AP) applicable to India may have to be negotiated and agreed to at a later date , it is absolutely necessary that a prior agreement between the IAEA and India on the essential features of such an Additional Protocol must be reached simultaneous with the finalization of the safeguards agreement and before signing it . The most intrusive actions under safeguards are always taken on the basis of this protocol , including the “pursuit clause” which permits interference with our non-civilian programs on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion . India needs to make it clear what the limits are beyond which we will not entertain any IAEA action or intrusion , and it should be clear that a standard Model Protocol applicable to non-nuclear weapon States will not be acceptable to India. The leverage to debate and get the kind of restricted additional protocol we want will be entirely lost once a safeguards agreement alone is first put in place and the installations put under safeguards . As we understand , the limitations within which India is willing to enter into the Additional Protocol regime was neither discussed by Indian negotiators at the IAEA nor do they appear in the safeguards draft or its attachments. The government needs to clarify their thinking on the additional protocol before proceeding to the IAEA Board .

Reprocessing the spent-fuel arising from burning fresh imported fuel in our civilian reactors provides us valuable additional plutonium , which in turn can be recycled into future civilian fast-breeder reactors (FBRs) or advanced heavy water reactors (AHWRs) Reprocessing , therefore , is at the core of India’s plans to build long-term energy security.

The government had all along pledged to secure an unqualified right to reprocess spent-fuel and even termed India’s right to reprocess “non-negotiable” . But , in the 123 Agreement , what has finally been obtained is merely an empty theoretical right to reprocess.

The actual permission to reprocess will come after years, when a dedicated state-of-the art reprocessing plant is built anew to treat foreign fuel , along with a host of allied facilities .

There will be a large number of safeguards & additional protocol issues related to this , and all these hurdles will have to be crossed to reach the beginning of reprocessing . Much of the fundamental basis on which all this will be done has to be discussed and settled now at the outset, while the overall safeguards agreement is being finalized . But , the government has not done this exercise during the recent set of negotiations with the IAEA , and this deficiency will come to haunt India in future unless it is removed.

In the above manner , there are several other key safeguards-related issues of crucial importance , for which no one , including the UPA-Left Committee which the Government created , has been provided answers . None of the issues raised in this Press Release can be addressed adequately and in an acceptable manner unless the entire safeguards agreement and its associated papers are made available to the UPA-Left Committee for their evaluation , as well as to a set of independent national experts who have so far not been part of the Government’s negotiations with the IAEA.”

Source: Rediff News

Signing 123 Agreement amounts to accepting American Hegemony Opinion

M.P. Veerendra Kumar

If the 123 Agreement is not bound by the overarching Hyde Act, then what else is its purpose?

“At the stroke of midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom…” Thus spoke Nehru at midnight on August 14, 1947. Sixty-one years later, as India slept in the wee hours of July 9, 2008, the Congress-led government bartered away our sovereignty in the Japanese scenic town of Tôyako. On the sidelines of the G-8 summit, the repudiation of the Nehruvian principles of foreign policy found its culmination before the American President George Bush, with the brokering of the nuclear deal.

Legacy traduced

The legacy of the Congress party, which under the helmsmanship of the Mahatma delivered us from British colonial enterprise, stands traduced. Earlier, Dr. Manmohan Sigh confessed, at Oxford, to an admiration of certain aspects of colonial subjugation all of which “we still value and cherish,” and which were the result of India’s meeting the “dominant empire of the day.” Here it is pertinent to remember the recent observation of Nicholas Burns, the former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, that had Nehru been alive, such an agreement would have been inconceivable.

The ‘123 Agreement,’ so-called because it will amend Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (titled “Cooperation With Other Nations”), which establishes a basis for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear agreements between the U.S. and any other country, aims at translating the India-U.S. nuclear deal into reality. The implication of the Hyde Act, signed into legislation by President Bush on Dec. 18, 2006, on the 123 Agreement has not been acknowledged by our government. If the 123 Agreement is not bound by the overarching Hyde Act, then what else is its purpose?

The Act envisages India formulating “a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the U.S., and is working with the U.S. on key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation.” In addition, the U.S. President is required to annually report to Congress whether India is fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and if necessary sanction and contain Iran if it pursues indigenous efforts to develop nuclear capabilities. These stipulations in the Act constitute an intrusion into our independent decision-making and policy matters.

Threat to sovereignty

Certain clauses even threaten our national sovereignty. Article 14 grants the U.S. a unilateral right to require the return by the other party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material of components transferred under this agreement, and any fissionable materials produced through their use. The “right of return” mentions “the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party” (Article 14.5) of this equipment and materials rather than their return. Have we publicly debated enough the nuance of this wording, which can even be interpreted as sanctioning military intervention?

The Prime Minister’s assurance that the IAEA safeguards agreement would be “India-specific,” and that we would secure assurances of uninterrupted fuel supply, and the rights to build a “strategic fuel reserve” and take “corrective measures” in case of an interruption in supplies, has also been challenged. The agreement circulated among the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency does not feature these in the main text. It occurs only in the preamble, which does not have any legal force.

Moreover, the body of the text is quite similar to the wording of the standard safeguards agreement the IAEA signs with non-nuclear weapons states. This has invited informed criticism that it fails to defend India’s strategic autonomy as a de facto nuclear weapons state, as Dr. Singh promised. The nature of the ‘corrective measures’ is also unknown. There is no explicit guarantee of uninterrupted fuel supplies — a role the IAEA cannot fulfil as it is not a fuel supplier — and is the preserve of the NSG. In the current international scenario, both these bodies are amenable to American influence. That such doubts have been raised by nuclear scientists of proven integrity like Dr. P.K. Iyengar, Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, and Dr. A.N. Prasad calls into question the claims of the government.

Beyond these diplomatic and technical affairs, to those who value democracy the most disquieting aspect is the entry of crony capitalism into the hallowed portals of our Parliament. The government’s efforts to cobble together a simple majority to win the vote of confidence are tainted by brazen pandering to the demands of corporate interests. Invariably the agenda of corporates will be in conflict with the aspirations of the masses that have elected us. If instead of reverberating to public issues, were Parliament to be turned into an arena for the promotion of the mega-business agenda, it would be a betrayal of the ideals of the martyrs of our freedom struggle as well as of the sagacious framers of our Constitution.

Reckless zeal

It amazes the nation that the Prime Minister and his party should exhibit such reckless zeal in pursuing the 123 Agreement in the realm of foreign policy, superseding domestic dal-roti issues, to the point of staking the very survival of the government on a single throw of the nuclear dice. What could be the motivation behind taking into confidence America and not our own people and their elected representatives? On the contrary, can the sincerity and patriotism of those who suspect the government and its supporters of misleading the nation be doubted? Especially in the context of various organs of the government talking in different tongues, betraying a blatant lack of transparency. Here we have to pay tribute to our vigilant media that shamed the government into putting on their website the IAEA safeguards agreement, which till then was misleadingly termed as “classified.”

Reneged on CMP

Such shenanigans in keeping in the dark even allies led to the disintegration of the UPA. Through sundering its covenant with the Left, in its unseemly haste to pitch our tent in the American camp, the Congress has reneged on one significant aspect of the National Common Minimum Programme evolved in 2004. It was eloquent in the matter of this government striving to build a multi-polar world order. Signing this agreement amounts to accepting American hegemony in the ‘unipolar moment.’

An issue that calls for debate is the very rationale of nuclear power, which is costly. Hence, we need to review nuclear power as an energy option. After devoting a substantial portion of energy allocation to the nuclear sector, a measly 3 per cent of our needs is met by this sector. Moreover, worldwide it has been proved to be a discredited mode of energy generation, given the health-risks, environment damage, potential for hazards, and waste disposal problems associated with the industry. We should not allow our country to be turned into a dump of nuclear waste.

A possible scenario could be the emergence in another 10 years of technology to unlock energy from frozen methane, which can last for tens of thousands of years. Wind power, solar power, and tidal energy are other cleaner forms of power that should be encouraged.

We should conscientiously resolve to look at this vote not as an expedient means to tide over a temporary crisis, but as one that will have a bearing on our future generations, who will be yoked to the neo-imperialist design. Our billion-plus population expects us to be led by the spirit of non-alignment in this respect. Our rage at this indecent burial should reflect their anger.

My appeal to fellow parliamentarians is that when the final hour of democratic reckoning comes, we should stand tall and summon the courage to forsake narrow political differences. The House of the People should not be degraded into a mere reporting body to ratify agreements of such epochal import. As B.P. Jeevan Reddy, former Supreme Court judge, wrote in this newspaper on August 10, 2007: “There is no such thing as a ‘prerogative power’ of the executive, immune from parliamentary scrutiny.” Were it not so tragic, we could have appreciated the delicious irony that the Hyde Act mandates that the American Congress should be in 30 days of continuous session to consider the agreement, while here we dismiss it through voting on a one-line motion debated over just two days!

(M.P. Veerendra Kumar, Member of the Lok Sabha, is the Leader of the Janata Dal (S) Parliamentary Party.)

Source: The Hindu

US Ready to Do Business with Minority Govt.

N-deal: US ready to do business even with minority govt.

Washington, July 21, 2008: Ahead of the crucial trust vote that will decide the fate of the UPA government, the US on Monday said it will move forward on the nuclear deal with any dispensation in New Delhi — even if it is in minority.

Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher said Bush administration will have no problem in dealing with a minority government as “minority governments are common around the world.”

“I don’t have them off the top of my head, but I mean, minority governments are common around the world,” he said.

“You can’t say, ‘Oh, well, we are going to stop dealing with you till the next election or until some new coalition or something. That’s not for us to say,” Boucher said commenting on the future of the nuclear deal if the UPA government fails to win the confidence vote in the Lok Sabha.

He said the US will continue to work with any legitimate government in India New Delhi to push forward the deal.

“If they have a legitimate government — people who are empowered to run the government — that’s who we’ll deal with,” Boucher said.

“In terms of the United States and India, we deal with the legally constituted government of India — whoever is running that government at the time, that’s who we sign agreements with. So, that’s not a problem for us,” he said.

He said the Bush administration was ready to “go as far as” possible to see conclusion of the deal.

“We are going to work with the Indians, we are going to work with the Congress and we are going to take this as far as we can go,” Boucher said.

“We are very excited by the prospect, we’ll see what happens in the confidence vote, but however far the Indians could go, we are going to try to take it that far or further. So, that’s what we are going to do,” he said.

May not be “too late”

Asked about whether Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was little too late in pushing ahead with the deal, Boucher said it may not be “too late.”

“I guess what I’ll say is it’s never too late. This is not a deal between a government and another government. It’s a deal between the United States and India — it’s good for India, it’s good for the United States.”

On whether main opposition BJP’s contention that without parliamentary approval the UPA government does not have the moral right to conclude the nuclear deal, Boucher said “on our side, there is no legal problem or moral problem”.

“On their side there may not be a legal question, but there’s always political questions and they’re going to have to figure that one out themselves

“(But) As long as they are a duly constituted government, we are happy to deal with them,” he said.

On the timeframe left for the 110th Congress to clear the deal, Boucher said the administration would try to push it and if the present Congress could not ratify it then the new Congress would take it up.

“As we move through, if we can move it to the point where the president can certify all the things that he has to certify, take the package and send it to Congress, we’ll do that. If the Congress is in a position to act on it, I am sure they’ll try to do that.

“So, I think, everybody wants to take it as far as we can. I can’t promise what the US Congress will do, but if we take it to some point and times expires on this Congress, then the new Congress will have to take it up — that’s all you can say. So, that’s our pledge.”

Why I Oppose Indo-US Nuclear Deal

Has America Really Exempted India from Hyde Act?

Prodip Chandra Roy

The answer is a big ‘NO’. India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or NPT. That is why as per prevailing US law America had to pass a special act to permit US President to sign Nuclear Deal with India. That act is Hyde Act. This permission is being touted as ‘exemption’.

In reality by providing permission the US parliament has roped India into a set of conditions.

The conditions are:

1) India must adopt a foreign policy congruent to that of the United States.

2) India must ensure full and active cooperation in US effort to dissuade, isolate and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran.

3) India can never create adequate nuclear power reactor fuel reserve.

4) India’s total civil nuclear facilities, materials and programmes will have to be permanently under IAEA scanner.

5) Every year US President has to submit a report to the US parliament that India is following US diktats fully in regard to its nuclear programmes and foreign policy.

6) If for any reason America terminates agreement, the remaining countries of the Nuclear Supplier Group or NSG will have to follow suit. NSG will have to frame such rules while granting permission to India.

7) Until India signs Indo-US Nuclear Deal or 123 Agreement no other country of the NSG can start nuclear trade. This provision will also to be incorporated while granting NSG permission.

8> India will not get advanced technologies for nuclear fuel reprocessing, Uranium enrichment and heavy water production.

All these conditions are detrimental to India’s independent foreign policy and independent nuclear policy.

Hyde Act says, even though US falters, India can never oppose and question its actions. If opposes, US President will give adverse report to its parliament; and the agreement will become null and void immediately. The consequence? India will have to return all those materials and facilities it acquired over the years at lakhs of crores of rupees.

Therefore, to keep the pact alive India will have to surrender and bend  to US imperialism permanently.

After reading these lines can any patriotic Indian not oppose this notorious deal?

What Chandan Mitra Speaks

Arguments in favour of Indo-US nuclear deal are dubious

Chandan Mitra

 

Does India need a civilian nuclear energy agreement with the US? Is this the best deal we could have got? Why is the Bush administration trying so hard to push India into signing this deal? Has the prime minister gone about it in the best possible way? Are we bartering away our nuclear sovereignty in the process, thereby endangering our goal to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent?

 

These are some of the key questions that needed to be satisfactorily answered in the context of the ongoing controversy that has snowballed to a point where it threatens the stability of the Manmohan Singh government. Unfortunately, the political rhetoric that is flying thick and fast for the last one year and more has obfuscated the core issues involved.

Enough has been spoken and written about the need to secure India’s energy needs, especially in view of rising oil prices and India’s near-total dependence on imports. Sceptics, on the other hand, have argued that even after investing billions of dollars to set up new reactors, nuclear power will contribute just about 7 per cent of the country’s energy requirements by 2020.

But even if it is conceded that India needs every extra megawatt of energy that can be generated, whatever the source, the question still remains whether the Indo-US nuclear deal in its present form is the best that we could have bargained for. On balance, it appears that the deal is good for everybody else, apart from India.

First, we will end up putting huge sums into the coffers of foreign manufacturers of nuclear reactors — mainly French, Russian and American. Second, the estimated cost per unit of nuclear energy will be prohibitively high compared to coal, gas and even crude. Can India afford power at such a high cost when alternative sources have not been exhausted? Without getting into the nuclear sovereignty issue, it can be asserted that the additional energy to be generated through uranium-based reactors will be of dubious benefit.

It is often argued that the US administration has been exerting pressure on the Indian establishment because President George W Bush, reeling under unfavourable popularity ratings, wants to exhibit it as his one great foreign policy success. This is utterly fallacious: most Americans have not even heard of this deal, given their proverbial insularity and selfobsession. Further, the Republicans are hardly expected to make this an issue in the November presidential election.

Interestingly, most western powers have been vigorously pushing for the deal, although with greater sophistication than the sledgehammer tactics characteristically employed by Americans.

 
Diplomacy, after all, is not based on altruism. Surely, they are not falling over one another out of love or compassion for India.

 
Apart from the business potential, the deal is being driven in western capitals by the motive of firmly roping India into the non-proliferation regime. India has an unblemished record here, but there are concerns about the future in view of the volatility of the Asian theatre. Since India cannot officially be admitted into the NPT, the deal has attempted to manoeuvre us into a situation where New Delhi becomes a de facto signatory to the NPT, just as we will be conferred the dubious distinction of being a de facto nuclear weapons state once we sign the deal.

Following the disclosure of the text of the IAEA safeguards agreement, it is abundantly clear that, while international inspection and safeguards shall be imposed permanently on our reactors, the exemptions remain doubtful. It is widely known that for all practical purposes no further testing shall be permitted. The government has repeatedly highlighted the “walk out” clause to claim that India can test whenever it wants and even if the US imposes sanctions, we can still negotiate with other countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to maintain uninterrupted uranium imports. This is complete hogwash. Can anybody in his right mind believe that the US will patronisingly oversee the supply of fissile material by other countries even after India conducts another nuclear test?

It would be more honest to admit that the Indo-US nuclear deal is a three-in-one document comprising a civilian energy cooperation agreement with the US, de facto NPT and de facto CTBT. A discussion on the merits and demerits of the deal would be meaningful only if we begin from this premise instead of deluding ourselves into believing that, possessed by a burning desire to help India, the US wants to hand out a “give-give” agreement with us and that nothing will change as far as our military nuclear programme is concerned.

Whichever way you look at the deal, honestly or deceitfully, it is a huge political albatross. Manmohan Singh has been forced to risk his government’s fate and enter into a questionable alliance with a party not known for scrupulous adherence to norms of probity in public life. When the prime minister first challenged the Left to pull out last September, it was perhaps the best moment for the Congress to go for an early election buoyed by high growth, manageable inflation and opposition incoherence.

Today, all three factors are ranged unfavourably against the ruling party. Manmohan Singh has never claimed to be a master strategist, but others in his party are known for their political acumen and manipulative skills. However, they got cold feet last year and now the Congress is set to pay a price for their vacillation. In politics, as in other spheres of life, you win only if you dare; defeat is inevitable if you dither and delay.

The writer is a member of the Rajya Sabha, and Editor, The Pioneer (New Delhi)

 

What Dr Placid Rodriguez has to say…

Dr Placid Rodriguez, former president of Indian Nuclear Society and ex Director of Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, said the deal comes under the whole gamut of strategic alliance covering defence, space, nuclear and agriculture.

Bangalore, July 15, 2008: An eminent scientist has expressed fear that after the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, Washington may try to push its agricultural agenda and defence sales to New Delhi. “My greatest reservation (about the deal) is that the strategic alliance between India and the US is going into agriculture because in the other three sectors (defence, space and nuclear) we are strong and we can go independently and we will go,” Rodriguez said. “Our agricultural universities, state universities, ICAR (Indian Council of Agricultural Research) laboratories — they will be completely overwhelmed by giants like Monsanto whose resources are plenty and whose motivation is only monopoly,” he said. After Bt. cotton, now genetically modified brinjal is going to be brought in, Rodriguez said, adding, “we don’t know what’s next”. “Even European Commission has not accepted genetically modified food and we are not examining all the consequences“. The former President and Honorary Secretary of Indian National Academy of Engineering said another “lubricant” (for the US to sign the deal with India) behind the 123 agreement is the “large possibility of defence sales (in India}”. “We are in the market for 125 fighters (a multi-billion dollar business opportunity). In fact, we will not buy any reactor from the US for 20 years. We will be buying reactors from Russia and France. What the US wants is a monopoly in agriculture sector“, Rodriguez said. While Russia, France and to some extent Israel are India’s collaborators in defence equipment, the US wants greater pie of the Indian defence market, he said. Rodriguez expressed the view that the deal is actually an international civil nuclear cooperation agreement — a deal between India and international community — and has been given “wrong connotation” that it’s an Indo-US deal, attracting opposition from the left parties. Ardent supporters of the deal, including Prime Minister, “played too much” about the deal, he said. “After all, IAEA is a 145-member body in which US is also a member. NSG is a group of 45 nations. So, it’s actually an agreement between two groups and the US is the strongest and most powerful member of the groups,” he said. While stating that the deal is “acceptable”, he said there are certainly question marks. “What if the US President (after the safeguards agreement with IAEA and NSG) says that the decisions are governed by the Hyde Act which is ultimate,” he asked. He said India has agreed to a clause in the 123 agreement that the agreement would be subject to the national laws of the two nations. But it would have been better to say it would be subject to existing international laws, Rodriguez said. “It has been suggested that we must also pass a national act which says we are not bound by Hyde Act because it’s our national law. That’s only way of getting over it,” Rodriguez said. He also disagreed with the view that the agreement with the US is the full civil nuclear cooperation deal, saying reprocessing, heavy water technology and enrichment have been kept out of its purview. On the issue of reprocessing, there are conditions, he said. “We have to build new plant exclusively from the imported fuel materials and thereafter we have to give result of reprocessing and they will come back to us with decision after one year; it does not say that a favourable decision will be taken,” he said.

Venkaiah says…

‘Centre in hurry to push N-deal to cover up failures’

Hyderabad, July 15, 2008: BJP senior leader M. Venkaiah Naidu on Monday alleged that to cover up its failures, the UPA government was in a hurry to push Indo-US nuclear deal which was against the interest of the nation.

“Without a comprehensive deliberation on the issue and without taking into the confidence of Left parties and opposition BJP, the UPA government led by Congress party was in hurry for the deal to cover up its failures in all fronts,” Naidu told reporters here.

“It all shows immature way of handling of the UPA government the situations like external affairs,” the BJP leader said.

Instead of dealing with the very alarming situation of inflation which is likely to go upto 17 per cent, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was more concern for his prestige and trying to push forward Indo-US nuclear deal, he alleged.

Terming the Indo-US deal against the interest of the people of the country, Naidu said the scientist community is divided on the issue and let us not surrender our country’s sovereignty for the deal.